Rap Beef, Diss Tracks, and what Pennsylvania v. Knox can tell us about Protected Free Speech

In 2012, while facing criminal charges stemming from a traffic stop, Jamal Knox and his associate published a rap song on the Internet which made violent threats directed towards the officers who had arrested them. As a result, Knox and the other individual were charged with and found guilty on two counts of witness intimidation and terroristic threats. Knox appealed this verdict to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the grounds that his lyrics were protected free speech and were not meant to be interpreted literally. Subsequently, the case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, leaving the court to determine whether the video constituted “protected free speech or a true threat punishable by criminal sanction.” [1] Pennsylvania v. Knox (2018) is situated in a larger debate concerning the extent to which rap music constitutes protected free speech. More specifically, this case tested the limits of rap as a form of free speech and the extent to which the First Amendment tolerates violence expressed in rap lyrics. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s limited understanding of the nuances of rap, and their judicial narrowing of this art form as monolithic, has set precedent that inserts legal and textual ambiguity into the nexus between between free speech and rap. 

At the center of this case are the specific lyrics rapped by Knox in the video that he published online. Knox uses lines such as “This first verse is for Office Zeltner and all you fed force bitches/And Mr. Kosko, you can suck my dick you keep on knocking my riches,” “I’ma jam this rusty knife all in his guts,” and “Well your shift over at three and I’m gonna fuck up where you sleep.” [2] In assessing these lyrics, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine if, despite their violent and specific threats, the lyrics could still be considered protected free speech. 

In evaluating the appellant’s claim, the court utilized two previous landmark Supreme Court decisions on free speech: Watts v. U.S. (1969) and Virginia v. Black (2003). Watt established a framework through which courts can judge “whether a speaker’s words constituted a true threat” by assessing the “contextual circumstances.” Specifically, courts can reach a decision by examining “how a reasonable listener would construe the speech in context.” [3] Importantly, the reasonable observer as defined by Watt is not necessarily the person at which the threat is directed and can include outside observers or witnesses to the threat. Black established that states could criminalize speech that had a specific intent to “terrorize or intimidate” [4] and could evaluate whether this intent existed by using the “contextual circumstances” framework established in Watt. Using these precedents, the court sought to determine whether the appellant’s lyrics constituted terroristic threats by examining the contextual circumstances of the lyrics and a reasonable listener’s interpretation of said lyrics. 

Ultimately, the court upheld Knox’s conviction on three grounds: the lyrics did not include “political, social, or academic commentary” [5], the lyrics specifically targeted two police officers and directed threats towards them [6], and the police officers felt threatened by the actions, meaning that a reasonable person would have viewed the threats seriously. [7] The court did acknowledge “the unique history and social environment from which rap arose” [8] and the artistic use of violent imagery in this art form. However, they argued that, despite these considerations, the aforementioned evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the speech was not protected. 

While the court demonstrated a basic understanding of rap, their reasoning in upholding Knox’s conviction suggests a significant lack of knowledge on the intricacies of the genre. As dictated by Watt and Black, the court had to examine all relevant circumstances and contexts of the song. Yet, they failed to strictly identify Knox's song as constituting a “diss track.” Conventionally, the diss track is a type of rap song that consists mainly of insults directed towards a specific individual or artist [9]. These songs are usually published by rappers engaged in disputes to express their dislike towards their adversary without engaging in physical violence. However, these songs do not include simple insults, but instead use devastating lyrical barbs which commonly contain threats of violence and homophobic language. [10]

To understand how Knox’s song may have constituted a diss track, it is necessary to examine two diss tracks that exemplify this genre: Takeover, by Jay-Z, and Ether, by Nas. These tracks were published in short succession in 2001 when the rappers were engaged in a protracted public dispute, also known as a “beef.” In Takeover, Jay-Z claims his associates will “kidnap your babies, spit at your lady” and tells Nas that he can expect “70 shots to your frame.” [11] Similarly, in Ether, Nas claims that Jay-Z will end up “In a pine box with nine shots from [Nas’s] glock” and makes other threats such as “semi-autos at your cartilage” and that Jay-Z’s entire record label will get “gunned up and clapped quick.” [12] Moreover, both songs include numerous homophobic insults. At the time, people did not view these threats as legitimate. Rather, it was understood that these songs were a form of artistic competition, contestation, and expression. 

Knox’s song bears many similarities to Takeover and Ether. Knox begins by explicitly stating that he has “beef” with the officers [13]. As a rapper with the stage name “Mayhem Mal,” [14] Knox is establishing this “beef” in his capacity as a rapper. As we have seen by the example of Jay-Z and Nas, rappers settle their disputes through the publishing of diss tracks. Surely, if Knox was an aspiring rap artist, he would have been aware of these conventions. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that Knox was addressing his “beef” through the publishing of a diss track, as would be expected for a rapper in this situation. Thus, all the lyrics in this song can be interpreted in the same manner as Ether and Takeover - as forms of artistic expression. Furthermore, the lyrics themselves closely resemble these two other songs. At the beginning of his song, Knox directs a homophobic insult towards one of the officers, telling Mr. Kosto to “suck my dick.” Here, homophobia, a trope of diss tracks, is used by Knox. Additionally, the threats of violence he makes, such as “jam this rusty knife all in his guts” and “I’m gonna fuck up where you sleep” are comparable to the threats made by Jay-Z and Nas towards each other. These two examples demonstrate how Knox’s lyrics closely adhere to the conventions of other diss tracks. 

Judging by the clear contextual and stylistic similarities between Knox’s song and other diss tracks, a reasonable observer (the standard defined in Watt) would likely conclude Knox’s song was intended as a diss track. The reasons given by the court in upholding Knox’s conviction are in direct contradiction to this conclusion. In determining that a reasonable person would have interpreted Knox’s lyrics as credible threats, the court cited the reactions of the two police officers. However, we have established that a different type of reasonable observer, namely someone with a knowledge of rap culture and the methods of expression contained therein, would have concluded the opposite. Moreover, Knox’s video was most likely circulated within the local hip hop community, meaning that those first encountering the video would possess an adequate knowledge of rap culture. Therefore, many of the reasonable observers viewing the video would have understood Knox’s song as a diss track, and not as a credible threat. Using the framework provided by Watt and Black, Knox’s lyrics would thus be considered protected free speech. Overall, we have made a reasonable argument that clearly contradicts the court’s decision. While this argument is not entirely impregnable, we can still see how it exposes the weaknesses in the court’s argument and introduces significant uncertainty into the court’s decision. 

The court’s failure to consider the existence of diss tracks, a legitimate genre of rap, speaks to their overly simplistic view of the genre. In judging Knox’s song, the court examined it for clear “political, social, or academic commentary.” In other words, they operated with the mistaken belief that only explicitly socially-conscious rap could be justifiable. However, Knox’s song, while not containing this type of commentary, still constituted the cultural phenomenon of “rap beef” and the ways in which this phenomenon is performed. By taking such a narrow view of rap, the court overlooked a key point and rendered their decision questionable. If the court had acknowledged that the song could have been reasonably construed as a diss track, and thus was protected free speech, they could have signaled to other courts that rap music is a legitimate and complex art form that necessitates a detailed consideration of context when making any decision concerning the intersection between it and protected free speech. Instead, as a clearly flawed decision, Pennsylvania v. Knox has introduced further ambiguity into the free speech protections offered to rap. 

[1] Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Jamal Knox, https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2018/2017-codo-2.html (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2018), 8. 

[2] Ibid., 3.

[3] Ibid., 14.

[4] Ibid., 18.

[5] Ibid., 19.

[6] Ibid., 20.

[7] Ibid., 21.

[8] Ibid., 22.

[9] Hodge, Kyle. “Why Rap Beef Is Good For Hip-Hop Culture.” HIGHSNOBIETY, June 7, 2018. https://www.highsnobiety.com/p/rap-beef-is-good-for-hip-hop/. 

[10] Ibid.

[11] Carter, Shawn. “JAY-Z – Takeover Lyrics | Genius Lyrics.” Genius. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://genius.com/Jay-z-takeover-lyrics.

[12] Jones, Nasir. “Nas – Ether Lyrics | Genius Lyrics.” Genius. Accessed October 25, 2019. https://genius.com/Nas-ether-lyrics.

[13] Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Jamal Knox, https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2018/2017-codo-2.html (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2018), 3. 

[14] Ibid., 3.