Roundtable #6 | The Promises and Problems of the International Criminal Court

Section One: The History and Structure of the ICC 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an autonomous international tribunal that is authorized to condemn individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. Established by the Rome Statute in 2002, the ICC is the first and only international court with such jurisdiction. One hundred and twenty-three countries have signed on to the Rome Statute, which establishes the court’s jurisdiction, structure, and telos to “guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice.” [1] 

The court has eighteen elected judges, each from a different member state, and it requires its members to seek a gender-balanced bench that represents each of the United Nations’ five regions. [2] The ICC is not meant to replace national courts, and, unlike the International Court of Justice—an organ of the United Nations (UN)—tries individuals, not states. [3] As such, the ICC claims to hold no political affiliation and attempts to base its decisions entirely on legal criteria stemming from the Rome Statute and other facets of international law. [4] 

While the ICC was officially established in 2002, it was not the first tribunal of its kind. The first international tribunal was set up to bring Nazi officials to justice in the the post-WWII Nuremberg Trials. [5] Then, in the 1990s, the UN held two ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  sought to prosecute crimes that occurred during the Yugoslav Wars, indicting a total of one hundred and sixty-one persons for violating customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. [6] Lasting from 1933 to 2017, the ICTY helped set the precedent for holding perpetrators of wartime atrocities accountable. Indeed, the creation of the tribunal itself was catalyzed by pressure from the international public and it was unanimously called to order by the UNSC. [7] During the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which lasted from 1994 to 2014, ninety-three individuals were indicted for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law. It was the first tribunal to deliver verdicts for genocide and to define and recognize rape as a means of perpetrating genocide. [8] 

Around the time of the ad hoc tribunals, a UN commission was already beginning to look towards creating a permanent and autonomous court. In 1998, the Rome Statute—the ICC’s founding treaty—was adopted by the UN General Assembly and subsequently entered into force in 2002. [9] Despite its ongoing institutional relationship with the UN, however, the ICC has jurisdiction to try individuals without a mandate from the UN. [10]

The ICC generally receives referrals from three separate groups: states that are party to the Rome Statute, non-ICC states that self-report crimes committed in their territories or by one of their nationals, and the UN Security Council (UNSC). In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor can open up an investigation proprio motu, or on its own initiative with permission from Pre-Trial Chamber judges. [11] Once a situation is referred, the Prosecutor decides whether there is a basis to investigate, finds if authorities at the national level are conducting trials, and notifies the states that are party to the tribunal whether it will conduct an investigation. [12] While the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor are elected by the Assembly of States Parties, which represents all state parties to the ICC, the UNSC and individual state parties may manipulate their referral power in pursuit of domestic political agendas. [13]  Section Three of this Roundtable will further elaborate on the referral system alongside criticism that it grants non-ICC members, who are not subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, undue power over who gets tried. 
Perhaps the most controversial component of the ICC’s jurisdiction is its ability to prosecute “crimes of aggression.” As defined by Article 9 of the Rome Statute, an “act of aggression” entails “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” [14] Because the ICC is independent from stakeholders and other international institutions, it has the flexibility to use prosecutorial power as leverage. Given the Prosecutor’s authority over state leaders, such power enables the ICC to prevent crimes before they occur; leaders who refrain from threats of aggression can avoid prosecution. [15] To this extent, the ICC can be considered a powerful independent check on state leaders; however, the value of this, as discussed below, is hotly contested.

Joanne Park

Roundtable Contributor

Section Two: The Successes and Promises of the ICC

Although the ICC has faced its fair share of criticism, calls to dissolve the organization are far too extreme, especially considering the Court’s accomplishments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its current work in Myanmar. Even if the ICC could be more proactive and efficient in its case selection and judgements, serious progress has been made toward guaranteeing human rights. Therefore, any proposals to reform the ICC moving forward must take full account of what the Court has done correctly. 

After its establishment in 2002, the Court did not render its first judgement until ten years later. In a move that was widely praised by the international community and human rights activists, the ICC sentenced Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to fourteen years of imprisonment for conscripting and enlisting child soldiers for the Union of Congolese Patriots. [1] As the founder of this political and militia group, Dyilo directed the Congolese military wing to snatch children from their families and force them into military service, often in direct conflict zones. [2] In 2012, Dyilo became the first person convicted by the ICC and the first warlord that was punished by any international body for exploiting children in war. Humanitarian organizations praised the ICC's decision, noting how it set a precedent for punishing war crimes and affirmed the rights of children. [3] Indeed, following Dyilo’s conviction, the ICC convicted other Congolese rebel leaders, such as Germain Katanga and Bosco Ntaganda, of war crimes. [4] In doing so, the ICC has been instrumental in securing international justice and making the world a safer place. 

The ICC also has the potential to play a pivotal role in ongoing cases. Many of these cases have been filed, with ten undergoing preliminary examinations and others in pre-trial proceedings or awaiting a final judgement. In Myanmar, for example, the ICC is currently investigating alleged ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Rohingya Muslims, an ethnic group in the western Rakhine State. Since its independence from Britain, Myanmar has viewed the Rohingya as foreign immigrants and denied them citizenship, along with many other basic rights. [5] Normally, the fact that Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute would make acts committed within the country inadmissible before the ICC. [6] However, at least one human rights violation has been committed against Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, a country that is within the ICC’s jurisdiction. [7] As a part of its initial proceedings in Bangladesh, the ICC also has the power to investigate “other related crimes,” which encompasses the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar. [8] If a clear link between violations in Bangladesh and Myanmar is found, the ICC Prosecutor would be able to litigate in Myanmar as well. [9] As an extension of its investigations in Bangladesh, the Court has already used provisional measures to command Myanmar to cease all Rohingya-related activities. Although it is unlikely that Myanmar's government will comply with all of these measures, it is important to note that problems with international enforcement are not unique to the ICC. In fact, recent reports suggest that other bodies like the United Nations Security Council have also faced systematic failures in responding to the Rohingya crisis. [10]

Nonetheless, the ICC has taken a step in the right direction. This case is relatively new on its docket, and if there is a ruling against Myanmar’s government, the precedent it may set has the potential to have a global impact. [11] This could start on a local level, with protections of other ethnic minorities in Myanmar from persecution. [12] Nevertheless, activists hope that such a precedent would  extend to other forms of religious and ethnic persecution across the world, such as  the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Tatars in Crimea. As with its successful convictions of Congolese rebel leaders, the ICC’s ongoing investigation in Myanmar reflects its potential to bring perpetrators of violence to justice. The Court certainly has its faults, as we will examine in the following sections of this Roundtable, but it has also evidently been a force for tremendous good. Given this, solutions to the Court’s problems ought to revolve around reformation rather than outright abolition. 

Animesh Joshi 

Roundtable Contributor

Section Three: The Illegitimacy and Inefficacy of the ICC

The ICC was established with the undeniably admirable and lofty goal of prosecuting those responsible for the worst atrocities imaginable, including genocide and crimes against humanity. While the ICC has made some advances towards achieving this goal, developments in recent years have shown that it simply has not met such expectations. This is apparent in the rising number of voices that question the ICC on two main grounds: legitimacy and efficacy. 

Since the inception of the ICC, critics have challenged its legitimacy as a global, unbiased institution for two main reasons. First, the ICC has an  apparent focus on the African continent, which has spurred not only criticism but also actual withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Second, there is a perceived Western hegemony over ICC proceedings that arises from the UN Security Council’s referrals. These criticisms will be explained in turn.

For the last two decades, the ICC has repeatedly come under fire for primarily prosecuting Africans and turning a blind eye to atrocities that take place outside of Africa. Of the thirteen situations currently under investigation, ten are focused on African countries. [1] Leaders of these countries have condemned this apparent bias for subjecting them to excessive persecution. For example, Burundi, which withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2017, accused the Court of being “a political instrument and weapon used by the West to enslave other States.” [2] [3] Other African nations, including Gambia and South Africa, have also expressed, and subsequently  retracted, intentions to leave the ICC. [4] The ICC’s distinctly narrow and arguably prejudicial focus on Africa significantly undermines its legitimacy, particularly given that the Court is supposed to embody the principles of internationality and universality.

In addition to criticism of the ICC’s focus on Africa, the referral procedure that triggers the Court’s jurisdiction has also sparked accusations of illegitimacy. Two forms of referrals to the ICC, those received from the UNSC and those received from state parties, have incited the most controversy. The authority of the UNSC to issue referrals has come under significant attack as three of its five permanent members--Russia, China and the U.S.--have not signed the Rome Statute. As council states, however, they possess veto powers and thus have the power to decide when the Court may investigate despite not submitting to the ICC’s jurisdiction themselves. [5] Another issue arises with state party self-referrals, which are open to abuse by countries seeking to distract from their own crimes and use the ICC as a means of discrediting opposition and furthering their own political agendas. This may be the case in the ongoing investigations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, where the state has accused rebels of criminal behavior. [6][7] Ultimately, the ICC’s referral system leaves too much room for exploitation and abuse by states. The ability of three states to have such significant control over a third of the ICC’s referral systems when they are not themselves party to the Rome Statute undermines the legitimacy of the Court and its purported impartiality. Similarly, some state party self-referrals may threaten to turn the Court from an international, independent judicial body into a tool that states use to delegitimize and undermine internal opposition.

When it comes to the initiation and execution of proceedings before the ICC, there are recurring practical issues that hinder the Court’s mission in two ways: by delaying the administration of justice and by preventing the very chance of seeing justice done in the first place.

ICC proceedings are patently slow-moving. Investigations can span years, if not decades; for instance, proceedings in Uganda that began in 2004 have still not concluded. [8] Such delays are a serious problem for ensuring that victims obtain the justice that they deserve. While it may be argued that justice cannot be rushed, injustice can easily arise from excessive delay. The possibility of procedural delays and injustice is only exacerbated by the Court’s limited resources. Indeed, the Court’s thirteen ongoing investigations and ten preliminary examinations put significant strain on its workforce of only 900. [9] [10] 

Beyond these administrative failings, the ICC’s reliance on the cooperation of member states to enforce warrants and surrender fugitives is arguably an even greater threat to the organization’s efficacy. Although such cooperation has often been forthcoming, any Court that must rely on the acquiescence of a third party to bring proceedings cannot truly be considered an effective judicial body. As individual states may simply ignore a warrant or request from the ICC, they have the potential  to substantially interfere in the effective administration of justice.

The comments made here do not paint a positive picture for the ICC. Its legitimacy and authority have been validly questioned, and the ICC has been critiqued as being biased and open to significant abuse. Indeed, any effective judicial action by the ICC is heavily limited by administrative and procedural barriers. While the institution itself is not an absolute failure, there is a clear need for reform to ensure the legitimate and effective administration of justice.

Simon Collerton

Cambridge Roundtable Collaborator

Section 4: The Future of the ICC

Spanning from the organization's disproportionate action in Africa to the undue referral and veto power of non-party states, problems of legitimacy and efficacy evidently plague the ICC. [1] These problems are also intertwined; without a respected base of authority, the decisions of any court will signify little to the individuals and governments it aims to oversee. To better advance the ICC’s mission of protecting human rights, both the function and composition of the Court must be reformed. First, the ICC should cooperate with both non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations to assist national judiciaries with redressing human rights violations. This includes greater communication with states, technical support (e.g. data compilation), and training. [2] Second, as permanent members of the UNSC, the United States, China, and Russia should become signatory members of the ICC. 

Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets forth the principle of complementarity, which establishes that the Court complements, rather than overrides, national jurisdiction. As a nod toward national sovereignty, this principle accords individual state judiciaries with the primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by its citizens. The ICC serves as a check on this duty. [3] Deference to national prosecutions, simultaneously, encourages countries to investigate and try perpetrators of human rights abuses themselves to deter and prevent these crimes, which ultimately is the principal goal of the ICC. [4] 

In response to criticism of the ICC’s Africa-heavy caseload and the Court’s inefficacy, the ICC should reinforce complementarity by providing more support to national jurisdictions. Further aiding national judiciaries would offer an answer to the allegation that the ICC disproportionately targets African countries and individuals. Supporting judicial systems in Africa through greater information sharing and training would reduce the need for African countries, such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (both of which have referred cases to the ICC that are still ongoing) to make referrals to the ICC because national judiciaries would have the capacity to address crimes first. [5] [6]  Indeed, fewer cases overall under the purview of the ICC would create a caseload that does not overburden the Court’s limited resources. Moreover, by strengthening national judiciaries, the ICC could also counteract its reliance on member states to help facilitate parts of its investigations, such as by executing search warrants. States would be more inclined to comply with the requests of the ICC if the Court were to establish working relationships with countries to create a basis of mutual trust and respect. 

Bolstering both the ICC's legitimacy and efficacy also necessitates that the United States, China, and Russia officially become signatories to the Rome Statute. As permanent members of the UNSC, these three states have the power to veto any of its resolutions. Because these countries have not signed the Rome Statute themselves, however, their own citizens are largely insulated from the jurisdiction of the ICC. If these countries subject themselves to the same scrutiny that they themselves place upon other nations, some African leaders may retract, or at least soften their accusations that their states are unfairly pursued by the Court. In the long run, such a boost in the ICC’s legitimacy may help keep states from threatening to leave the Court altogether. [7] Some have concerns that even as members of the ICC, the United States, China, and Russia could still block cases involving their own citizens in an effort to shield themselves from prosecution. The ICC’s referral system, however, accounts for the requests of other member states and, with proper evidence, referrals from the Office of the Prosecutor itself, which in turn would mitigate such conflicts of interest. [8] In other words, numerous methods exist to refer cases to the ICC over which the United States, China, and Russia would not have control. This ensures that those countries cannot escape ICC investigations and prosecution of their citizens. 

Pressuring the United States, China, and Russia to assume official membership would not only uphold the legitimacy of the ICC but also give it greater jurisdiction to prosecute more human rights violations. This would extent to current allegations that the United States military and Central Intelligence Agency have committed war crimes, including torture, in their treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. [9] While the ICC is empowered to investigate U.S. action in this case because the alleged crimes occured in an ICC member country, the Trump administration has sought to thwart any investigation by taking unprecedented steps, including by placing sanctions on the Court and naming several of its personnel as targets. [10] President Trump has blatantly disregarded the ICC’s legal basis for pursuing American crimes committed in Afghanistan, which in turn interferes with the Court’s ability to properly investigate. To limit such intervention, the international community must push the United States to join the Court, broadening the ICC’s jurisdiction and creating a more straightforward process for it to function freely. 

For its part, China has faced mounting criticism for its alleged crimes against humanity and genocide against the Uighur population in Xinjiang. In July 2020, lawyers submitted evidence of China’s forced deportations of Uighurs from Tajikistan and Cambodia alongside evidence of other crimes, such as torture. [11] The ICC released a report in December 2020, however, indicating that it would not proceed with any investigations, citing a lack of evidence to demonstrate that the crimes occurred outside of China. [12] These developments speak to the necessity of China becoming an official member of the ICC so that the Court may expand its jurisdiction to address more egregious violations. China has consistently denied the allegations, even labelling them as “politically driven.” [13] Given this response, it is unlikely that China will join the ICC on its own; other international players must pressure it to do so. The same goes for Russia. In 2016, Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute, which it never ratified, in symbolic protest of the Court’s classification of its annexation of Crimea as an occupation. [14] As with the United States and China, Russian hostility indicates that external pressure is necessary to drive Russia to join the ICC.  

If the ICC is to live up to its purpose of investigating and prosecuting the most egregious international crimes, it must undergo reform. This includes assisting the capacities of national judiciaries as well as making the United States, China, and Russia official members of the ICC. Without these changes, the credibility of the ICC will only decline as more human rights violations go unpunished. 

Emma Barbarette

Roundtable Contributor

All Roundtable Sections Edited by Jessica Lin

Sources:

Section One

[1] United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Social Justice 26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 125-43.

[2] Jessica Moss, “The Role of the International Criminal Court”, Council on Foreign Relations, online at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court (visited November 18, 2020). 

[3] International Criminal Court, “Understanding the International Criminal Court.” 3 (n.d.).

[4] id at 4

[5] Benjamin B. Ferencz, “A Nuremberg Legacy: The Crime of Aggression.” 15 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., 556 (2016).  

[6] UN Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf ; footnotes omitted.

[7] id

[8] UN Doc. S/RES/955 (November 8, 1994), available at: https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/941108_res955_en.pdf ; footnotes omitted.

[9] Jessica Moss, “The Role of the International Criminal Court”, Council on Foreign Relations, online at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court (visited November 18, 2020). 

[10] International Criminal Court, “Understanding the International Criminal Court.” 3 (n.d.).

[11] id

[12] id at 17 

[13] id at 9

[14] United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Social Justice 26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 125-43.

[15] Hector Olasolo and Lucia Carcano, “The ICC Preventive Function with Respect to the Crime of Aggression and International Politics.” 58 Harvard International Law Journal, 67-68 (2017).

Section Two

[1] International Criminal Court, “Lubanga Case.” (n.d.).

[2] id

[3] UN News, In landmark ruling, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty of recruiting child soldiers, United Nations (2012) online at https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/03/406302-landmark-ruling-icc-finds-congolese-warlord-guilty-recruiting-child-soldiers (visited November 16,  2020).
[4] International Criminal Court, “Cases.” (n.d.).

[5] Al Jazeera Staff, Who are the Rohingya?, Al Jazeera (2018), online at aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/18/who-are-the-rohingya (visited November 19, 2020).

[6] Owen Bowcott, War crimes court approves inquiry into violence against Rohingya, The Guardian (2019), online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/war-crimes-judges-approve-investigation-violence-against-rohingya-icc-myammar (visited November 18, 2020).

[7] Joshua Cossin, ICC authorizes investigation into Myanmar crimes against humanity, Jurist (2019), online at https://www.jurist.org/news/2019/11/icc-authorizes-investigation-into-myanmar-crimes-against-humanity/ (visited on November 14, 2020).

[8] id

[9] Owen Bowcott, War crimes court approves inquiry into violence against Rohingya, The Guardian (2019), online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/war-crimes-judges-approve-investigation-violence-against-rohingya-icc-myammar (visited November 18, 2020).

[10] Human Rights Council Doc. A/HRC/39/64 (September 12, 2018) available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf; footnotes omitted.

[11] Grant Shubin, Implications of the Myanmar ICJ and ICC Cases for Non-Rohingya Minorities, Just Security (2020), online at https://www.justsecurity.org/71546/implications-of-the-myanmar-icj-and-icc-cases-for-non-rohingya-minorities/ (visited on November 14, 2020).

[12] id

Section Three

[1] International Criminal Court, Situations Under Investigation, online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx, (15 November 2020)

[2] Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Burundi, online at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/burundi, (15 November 2020)

[3] Agence France-Presse, Burundi becomes the first nation to leave international criminal court, The Guardian, Last updated 28 October 2017, online at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court, (15 November 2020)

[4] United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, online at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en#2, (15 November 2020)

[5] Laurel Hart, The International Criminal Court: biased or simply misunderstood?, UNA-UK, Last Updated 28 October 2018, online at https://www.una.org.uk/magazine/2018-1/international-criminal-court-biased-or-simply-misunderstood, (15 November 2020)

[6] International Criminal Court, Situations Under Investigation, online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx, (15 November 2020)

[7] Antonio Cassese, “Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4, 434-441, July 2006.

[8] International Criminal Court, Situation in Uganda, online at  https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda, (15 November 2020)

[9] Human Rights Watch, Support Needed to Tackle ICC Shortcomings, Last Updated 16 July 2019, online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/16/support-needed-tackle-icc-shortcomings, (15 November 2020)

[10] International Criminal Court, Situations Under Investigation, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx, (15 November 2020)

Section Four

[1] Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko, “How Effective the International Criminal Court Has Been: Evaluating the Work and Progress of the International Criminal Court,” 1 Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, 196 (2011). doi: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ndjicl. (visited November 15, 2020). 

[2] International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice, (2003), online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf (visited November 30, 2020). 

[3] Linda E. Carter, “The Future of the International Criminal Court: Complementarity as a Strength or a Weakness?” 12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 453 (2013). doi: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1446&context=law_globalstudies. (visited November 15, 2020). 

[4] id at 454

[5] International Criminal Court, Uganda, online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda. (Visited January 2, 2021). 

[6] International Criminal Court, Democratic Republic of the Congo, online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc. (Visited January 2, 2021). 

[7] Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court: Past, Present and Future, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (2014), online at https://7gxsl10eqdj9anba1k3swtoo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ICC-PastPresentFuture4-16-14.pdf. (visited November 17, 2020). 

[8] International Criminal Court, Understanding the International Criminal Court, online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf (Visited November 17, 2020). 

[9] Human Rights Watch, Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, (September 2, 2020), online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/02/qa-international-criminal-court-and-united-states#. (visited November 17, 2020). 

[10] International Criminal Court officials sanctioned by US, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (September 2, 2020), online at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54003527. (visited December 3, 2020). 

[11] Lily Kuo, Exiled Uighurs call on ICC to investigate Chinese 'genocide' in Xinjiang, The Guardian (July 7, 2020), online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/07/exiled-uighurs-call-on-icc-to-investigate-chinese-genocide-in-xinjiang. (visited November 17, 2020). 

[12] Javier C. Hernández, I.C.C. Won’t Investigate China’s Detention of Muslims, The New York Times (December 15, 2020), online at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/world/asia/icc-china-uighur-muslim.html. (visited January 2, 2021). 

[13] Lily Kuo, China says UN criticism of human rights record is ‘politically driven,’ The Guardian (November 6, 2018), online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/06/china-un-criticism-human-rights-record. (visited January 4, 2021). 

[14] Ivan Nechepurenko and Nick Cumming-Bruce, Russia Cuts Ties With International Criminal Court, Calling It ‘One-Sided,’ The New York Times (November 16, 2016), online at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/world/europe/russia-withdraws-from-international-criminal-court-calling-it-one-sided.html. (visited January 4, 2021).