Torres v. Madrid: What Constitutes “Seizure” under the 4th Amendment?
On July 15, 2014, two New Mexico State Police officers approached Mrs. Roxanne Torres as she hastily entered her car in her parking garage. [1] As Mrs. Torres was under the influence of methamphetamines, she claims that she believed the police officers to be carjackers and attempted to quickly speed away. Arguing that she endangered them in the process of her escape, the officers fired 13 bullets at Mrs. Torres and hit her twice before she was ultimately able to escape. [2] From this, a pertinent question befalls the highest court in the nation: does Mrs. Torres’ encounter constitute a seizure?
Mrs. Torres filed a civil rights claim in federal court, claiming that the police officers had used excessive force and had violated her Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful seizures. [3] The district court ruled—and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed—that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizure was not applicable because, as Torres was ultimately able to escape and wasn’t apprehended by law enforcement until later, she wasn’t technically “seized.” [4] This ruling might seem sound at first glance, but it contradicts existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter. Moreover, this ruling sets an extremely dangerous precedent of denying victims of police brutality proper legal recourse based solely on whether or not they were successfully able to flee.
There are two important cases from which federal jurisprudence derives the definition and applicability of seizures under the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Mendenhall (1980) and California v. Hodari D. (1991). In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the scope of “seizures”, as they apply to the Fourth Amendment, extend beyond that of merely an official arrest. For instance, in United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court found that a seizure occurs when “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” [5] Even if one were to question whether Mrs. Torres fits the standard of a “reasonable person” due to her being under the influence of methamphetamines, it seems clear that, even with reduced faculties, one would assume they were unable to simply end the encounter if they were being fired upon. As such, under this definition, it would be rather clear that a seizure had taken place in the case of Mrs. Torres’ escape because the use of deadly force would have made her believe that she was not free to end the engagement at any time.
California v. Hodari D. was argued before the Supreme Court in 1991. In this case, two police officers were on patrol in an unmarked car in Oakland, California. The officers took notice of a group of kids huddled around a red car and the kids panicked and ran away once they saw the police officers. The officers chased down one of these kids (Hodari D.) and, just before one of the officers apprehended him, he disposed of “what appeared to be a small rock” which later proved to be crack cocaine. [6] Hodari D. argued that the evidence of cocaine should be suppressed in trial because he was subject to an unlawful seizure at the time it was discovered.
Here, the Supreme Court expressly divided efforts by police to stop people into two categories. The first category consisted of efforts involving a “show of authority”, which included actions such as an order to stop or an officer placing their hand upon their weapon. [7] This form of effort to stop people was deemed to only be constituted as a seizure if there is “submission to an officer's ‘show of authority’ to restrain the subject’s liberty.” [8] In the cases of Hodari D. and Mrs. Torres, their respective interactions with law enforcement would not have constituted seizures under the first category, as neither individual submitted to the officer’s “show of authority.” However, the second category of authoritative effort to stop subjects, which constitutes a “quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,” involves “the application of physical force, however slight.” [9] In Hodari’s case, the officer didn’t apply physical force until after he had already discarded the illegal substances, so the evidence was ultimately not dismissed. However, in the case of Mrs. Torres—given the use of physical and even deadly force by police officers—precedent dictates that this encounter clearly qualifies as a seizure.
If upheld, the Tenth Circuit Court's ruling would not only shield police officers from ultimate liability in these cases, but it would also forbid any inquiry into the wrongdoing of the officer if the suspect escapes. The American Civil Liberties Union phrased it well in their amicus curiae brief: “If the Fourth Amendment is to govern meaningfully the state’s application of physical force, each application should be evaluated for its reasonableness, rather than categorically exempting a large swath of dangerous physical encounters from any Fourth Amendment constraints.” [10] This new precedent would pose a particularly great threat to communities of color, who are disproportionately likely to be victims of police brutality. [11]
According to a study by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, Latino men and Black women are approximately 1.4 times as likely to be killed by police as their white counterparts, while Black men are about 2.5 times as likely as white men to be killed by police force. [12] If any of these men or women were otherwise able to escape law enforcement, they would be denied the ability to contest the legality of the violence they faced. The NAACP argues that “[b]y exempting a category of police shootings from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, [this] decision...will make it even more difficult to remedy state-sponsored violence, thus exacerbating the reasonable fear of such violence that continues to define the lived experiences of too many African Americans.” [13] Indeed, Ashok Chandran, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Assistant Counsel, makes the case that “African Americans have borne the brunt of police brutality throughout our nation’s history until the present day” and that “[u]nduly narrowing the Fourth Amendment to exclude obvious forms of police uses of force from constitutional scrutiny will further endanger the lives of many Black individuals and deprive them of relief in even the most egregious cases.” [14]
Some may argue that other avenues of legal recourse exist for victims of police brutality, even if law enforcement cannot be found guilty of a Fourth Amendment violation. Protections against excessive force by law enforcement can also be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. [15] However, in many cases, the Fourth Amendment is the sole recourse for these victims. The Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable in the case of excessive force against a pretrial detainee because the Due Process Clause prevents the deprivation of liberty against these detainees without fair legal procedure. [16] Mrs. Torres, however, was not a pretrial detainee. As such, she and those in similar situations rely on the Fourth Amendment as their source of protection against police brutality. Specifically in Graham v. Connor (1989), the Court affirmed that the Fourth Amendment serves as the constitutional source of protection from cases of excessive force which arise “during arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure.” [17] Therefore, a failure to hear a Fourth Amendment defense would deny the sole source of legal recourse available to those like Mrs. Torres.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to rectify the legal misinterpretation of “seizures” set forth by the Tenth Circuit Court. The new rule imposed by the Circuit Court’s interpretation not only conflicts with historical foundations of Fourth Amendment principles—which have always intended to serve as a means of limiting government intrusions on persons and property—but also stands in direct opposition to the Court’s understanding of seizures as laid out by cases like California v. Hodari D. and United States v. Mendenhall. Even beyond that, this case is of paramount importance because of the dangerous miscarriage of justice that would ensue from establishing this new rule which defines seizures by law enforcement. With police brutality normalized within communities of color, the Tenth Circuit Court’s ruling must be rejected. The Supreme Court must ensure that potential victims of excessive force are, at the very least, afforded the judicial inquiry into law enforcement’s wrongdoing that they are due.
[1] Torres v. Madrid, 769 F. App'x 654 (10th Cir. 2019)
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid
[5] United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980)
[6] California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] American Civil Liberties Union Brief of Amicus Curiae, Torres v. Madrid, Docket No. 19-292 (2020)
[11] Amina Khan, “Getting killed by police is a leading cause of death for young black men in America”, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 2019, https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-08-15/police-shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-black-men (visited March 20, 2020)
[12] Frank Edwards et. al, “Risk of being killed by police use of force in the United States by age, race–ethnicity, and sex” Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States of America, 5 August 2019
[13] National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Amicus Curiae Brief, Torres v. Madrid, Docket No. 19-292 (2020)
[14] LDF Submits Amicus Brief Urging Supreme Court to Reaffirm Constitutional Protections for Citizens Shot by Police Officers, NAACP Legal Defense Fund (2020), online at https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-submits-amicus-brief-urging-supreme-court-to-reaffirm-constitutional-protections-for-citizens-shot-by-police-officers/ (visited March 20, 2020)
[15] Mitchell Karsch, “Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?” 58 Fordham Law Review 823 (1990)
[16] Ibid
[17] Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)