Monetary Compensation for Miranda Rights Violations

On April 20, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Vega v. Tekoh. [1] The case followed a criminal trial against Terence Tekoh, where a statement taken from him by Carlos Vega without his Miranda rights being read was admitted into the trial. Miranda rights stem from the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which establishes that statements taken from a defendant in custody are only admissible if the defendant understands his right to remain silent and speak to an attorney before those statements were taken. [2] From this case, with some variation across jurisdictions, the Miranda warning was created: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.” [3] These rights were upheld by Dickerson v. United States (2000), which decided that Congress cannot overturn Miranda rights by passing a law. [4]

In Vega, the dispute is whether a police officer taking a statement before Miranda rights are read to defendants is liable for monetary damages under Section 1983 when that statement is admitted in trial. Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” [5] Since police officers are not judicial officers, which Section 1983 makes an exception for, there are two main points Tekoh must prove in order to get his monetary compensation. [6] To prove that Section 1983 applies in this case, Tekoh must show that a constitutional right was violated and that Vega was liable for the damages caused by that violation. However, unless the current case establishes a new landmark decision making Miranda warnings a constitutional right, or clearly makes officers liable for damages from un-Mirandized statements, then Tekoh will be unlikely to receive compensation from the actions of Vega.

It is difficult for Tekoh to prove that Vega is liable, particularly because there is a major gray area as to whether a police officer is liable when an un-Mirandized statement is admitted in a trial. Four circuits (the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Seventh) have come to the conclusion that police officers are indeed liable for damages caused by the admission of un–Mirandized statements, relying on the direct line of causation because it is “the natural and probable consequence of that failure.” [7] On the other hand, four circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth) have found the opposite. [8] In Murray v. Earle (2005), the Fifth Circuit found that the chain of causation is broken between the officer and the admission of the un-Mirandized statements because a knowledgeable and informed prosecutor made the decision to admit the evidence. [9] Thus, liability in this case could be argued to not fall upon the officer, but instead the prosecutor. Discerning who the liability falls upon is crucial in whether or not Tekoh is successful, and the Supreme Court would have to make a landmark decision in order for him to be successful.

At first glance, one may find this to be a clear-cut case for the point of violating constitutional rights: Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated and he is eligible for compensation. The Ninth Circuit argued that Dickerson described Miranda warnings as a constitutional right. However, this may not be the case: while Dickerson upheld Miranda warnings, it also seemed to suggest that Miranda warnings are not themselves a constitutional right, but rather a prophylactic right. [10] This means that Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights, but rather rights made by the judicial branch that protect a constitutional right. Being read one’s Miranda warning is not considered a right secured by the Constitution, but rather judicially established rights. [11] Even the rule restricting the admission of un-Mirandized evidence can sometimes be a merely prophylactic rule. [12]

Therefore, following the wording of Section 1983, there is basis to show that a constitutional right was not violated. Dickerson establishes Miranda warnings as a heavily protected right, as Congress cannot change the rule, but one that is not equivalent to a constitutional right. [13] Thus, unless the current court overturns this distinction, Tekoh is unlikely to be able to meet this key requirement of the violation of a constitutional right.

If the court rules in favor of Tekoh, however, there will be a number of implications. Currently, the definition of “police custody” is very loose, meaning that there could be a dispute on when a defendant would need their Miranda rights read to them. Police custody would require a more precise definition — an exact time when someone needs their Miranda warnings. Additionally, liability being assigned to the police officers would create a judicially established causal connection between officers and un-Mirandized statements being admitted in court, increasing lawsuits against officers — as there have been numerous lawsuits related to this connection in the past. [14] On a larger scale, it would entrench Miranda rights as constitutional rather than prophylactic, leading to further lawsuits in the future.

Edited by Will Foster

Sources:

[1] Vega v. Tekoh, Oyez, online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-499 (visited Feb. 27, 2022).

[2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

[3] Jeffrey L. Helms & Candance L. Holloway, Differences in the Prongs of the Miranda Warnings, 19 Crim. Just. Studies 77 (2006).

[4] Dickerson v. United States, 520 U.S. 428 (2000).

[5] 42 U.S.C. § 1983, online at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983 (accessed Feb. 27, 2022).

[6] Judicial Officer, US Legal, online at http://definitions.uslegal.com/j/judicial-officer/ (visited Feb. 27, 2022).

[7] Pet. for Cert in Vega v. Tekoh, O.T. 2021, No. 21-499, online at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-499/194293/20211001121022739_2021-10-01%20Vega%20v%20Tekoh%20Cert%20Pet%20with%20appendix.pdf (visited Apr. 16, 2022).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 293 (5th Cir. 2005).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.